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AS A REPEATED GAME*
ALBERTO ALESINA
This paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives
concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward-looking wage-
setters. If discretionary policies are followed, an economic cycle related to the
political cycle results in equilibrium. This cycle is significantly different from the
traditional "political business cycle." Reputational mechanisms due to the repeated
interaction of the two parties and the puhlic or commitments to a common policy
rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the
magnitude of the economic fluctuations.
•' ' I. INTRODUCTION
Two different approaches can be taken in modeling the rela-
tionship between the political system and macroeconomic policy. At
one extreme it can be assumed, following Downs [1957], that the
sole objective of political parties is to remain in office. They do not
care about the effects of their policies on the economy except
insofar as they influence voters' electoral choices. This assumption
produces the result that, for a given voting function and structure of
the economy, in a two-party system both parties propose the same
platform to the voters and implement the same policies if elected.
This result holds even if the parties are uncertain about voters'
preferences as long as they share the same information about
voters' tastes. The most important macroeconomic application of
this approach is probably the "political business cycle" of Nordhaus
11975] and McRae 11977].
The second approach, much less developed in the literature, is
to assume that different parties have different preferences concern-
ing the intrinsic properties of their economic policies, for example,
because each party represents the interests of a different constitu-
ency. In this case, if there is uncertainty about voters' preferences,
the two parties propose different platforms even if they share the
*This paper ts based on one chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard
University [May 1986]. I am greatly indebted to Jeffrey Sachs for having directed my
attention toward these issues and for many helpful conversations and suggestions. I
also benefited from conversations with Andrew Abel, Dilip Abreu. OlivieT Blan-
chard, Ramon Caminal, Andrew Caplin, Morris Fiorina. Benjamin Friedman.
Herscbel Grossman. Maria Herrero. Howard Rosenthal, and Susan Vitka. The
comments of a referee greatly improved the paper. Ente "Luigi Einaudi" provided
generous financial support. The views expressed in the paper are mine, as is the
responsibility for any mistakes. ^,
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same information about the distribution of voters' preferences.^
Thus, different parties are modeled as policymakers with different
objective functions. The parties gain access to policymaking via
elections with uncertain results.
This paper adopts the second approach: it is assumed that
parties care about the inherent effects of their policies and that
parties have different objectives and incentives.^ Which of the two
assumptions about parties' behavior is closer to the truth is an
empirical question, the answer to which may vary across countries
and time periods. The "political business cycle" approach has
received weak support from United States data.^ On the contrary, a
partisan view of macroeconomic policy implying that different
parties act differently when in office has received increasing sup-
port both for the United States and for other industrialized econo-
mies. In particular, empirical arguments have been made that
leftist parties in Europe and the Democratic party in the United
States have heen relatively more averse to unemployment and less
averse to inflation than conservative parties in Europe and the
Republican party in the United States/
The existence of two different policymakers that alternate in
office raises important questions concerning the credibility and
dynamic consistency of policy announcements. This paper analyzes
the interaction of two parties with different policy goals and
rational forward-looking wage-setters in a game-theoretic model
close to that proposed first by Kydland-Prescott [1977] and
extended by Barro-Gordon [1983]. In that game the private agents
(or wage-setters) act first by setting the nominal wage. The policy-
maker acts second. He has an incentive to announce a policy of low
inflation, but then would like to generate unexpected inflation in
order to reduce unemployment. Since the wage-setters are rational
and informed, they recognize this incentive and set the nominal
1. This result is proved in a context similar to that of this paper by Alesina
[1986], who extends earlier results by Calvert 11985] and Wittman [1977, 1983].
2. Bianchard [1985| has followed the same approach. In a somewhat different
setting, a similar approach is adopted by Minford-Peel [1982].
3. Nordhaus [1975) presents empirical evidence for the United States favorable
to his approach. Subsequent papers, for example, McCallum [1978], Golden-Poterba
[19801, aid several others, have rejected the "political business cycle" theory for the
United States.
4. Hibbs [1977] was the first to point out this empirical regularity and recently
reinforces his point [forthcoming]. Similar findings have been presented by Beck
[1982, 1984), Havrilesky [forthcoming], Tabellini-La Via [1986), and Alesina-Sacha
[forthcoming]. Poole-Rosenthal [1986] have shown that in general there is polariza-
tion in American politics concerning economic policy.MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 653
wage high enough to eliminate any incentive for the policymaker to
generate surprise inflation. If binding commitments are unavail-
able, the result of this game is in general inefficient, even though
reputational forces may mitigate the magnitude of the problem, as
Barro-Gordon 11983] first pointed out. In equilibrium, employment
cannot be affected by the policymaker and inflation is bigher than
optimal. Tbe model implies complete policy neutrality and an
inflationary bias.^
The present paper analyzes a similar game in the context of a
two-party system. The two parties assign different weights to
unemployment and inflation as economic "bads." In particular, the
parties differ in two crucial respects: their optimal policies are
different, as are their incentives to generate policy surprises. Tbus,
the two parties want to commit to different policy rules and have
different incentives to deviate from their commitments.
Tbe present paper shows tbat if the two parties are sbort-
sigbted, fluctuations in output and inflation connected with the
political cycle result in equilibrium. This economic cycle, bowever,
is quite difl"erent from the conventional "political business cycle" a
la Nordbaus and does not rely on irrational voting behavior,
irrational expectations, or misinformation of voters. It is shown that
costly economic fluctuations can be avoided if the parties recognize
tbat the adoption of a cooperative common policy rule makes both
constituencies better off in tbe long run. Tbus, when a party is
elected, it faces a choice: it can follow a policy that will maximize
short-run benefits for its constituency, or it can follow the coopera-
tive policy that makes both constituencies better off in tbe long run.
If binding commitments are available, the two parties should bind
themselves to tbe cooperative rule. Thus, this paper provides an
additional argument in favor of rules rather than discretion.**
Even if binding commitments are unavailable, reputational
forces arising from the repeated interaction of the two parties can
improve upon the discretionary outcome. The first best policy may
or may not be sustainable through reputational effects, depending
on several characteristics ofthe economic and political system.
5 A rapidly growing body of research has explored in depth this model
txcel ent surveys of this literature are Cukierman [1986]. Fischer [1986], and Rogoff
11987].
6. The issue of stabilization policy in the presence of unforeseen shocks is not
considered m this paper. Rogoff [1985] explores the relationship between the
benefits ot binding commitments to poiicy rules and the need of flexibility for
stabilization purposes.654 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OFECONOMICS
The paper also suggests rather precise empirical implications
for the United States; a model based on similar ideas has been
successfully tested by Aiesina-Sachs [forthcoming].
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
model. In Section III the discretionary equilibrium is characterized.
In Section IV the efficient frontier of the repeated game is obtained.
Sections V and VI address tbe problem of finding the best subgame
perfect policies. Section VII briefly extends the results to multipe-
riod administrations. The main results of the paper are summarized
in the concluding section.
II. THE MODEL
The economy is characterized by a standard supply function
without capital, expressed for convenience in rate of growth:
(1) jv-t = Y n, - u;,)-I-y; T > 0,
where y, is the rate of growth of output; 11, is the inflation rate; Wc is
the rate of growth of nominal wages; and y indicates the rate of
growth of output compatible with tbe natural rate of unemploy-
ment and has to be interpreted as the rate of growth prevailing in
tbe absence of policy intervention that changes the real wage.
Tbe private agents may be viewed as uncoordinated wage-
setters wbo set the nominal wage. They attempt to keep the real
wage constant at the level compatible with tbe "natural" rate of
growth iy). Wage contracts last one period and are signed at the end
of, say, period (t - 1) for period t. These contracts are not contin-
gent on the state of tbe world; in particular, full indexation is
excluded.' Therefore, wage-setters set the nominal wage growth
equal to expected inflation;
(2) u;, = nf = £(nj/,_i).
Tbe rate of growth of nominal wage is equal to the rational
expectation of inflation formed on the basis of tbe information set
available at time {t - 1) (i.e., E(n,|/ i_i)). Thus, the term "expect"
can be used intercbangeably witb the term "set the nominal wage
at."
Substituting (2) into (1) yields
(3) yt = y (n, - nn + y-
Tbere are two parties in this economy: party D and party R.
They differ in two respects. First, although tbey agree that inflation
7. None of the qualitative results of this paper would change if partial
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above a certain level is a "bad," party D is more sensitive than party
R to the cost of unemployment. Therefore, party D has a stronger
incentive than party R to generate unexpected inflation to promote
growth. The policymakers may judge the rate of unemployment
determined by the market to be too high because of distortions in
the labor market.^ Second, apart from considerations about unem-
ployment, the two parties disagree about the level of the optimal
inflation rate. Party D believes in higher government spending (for
example, to promote welfare programs) and is willing to use money
creation as a way of financing it: this implies that the optimal rate of
inflation is higher for this party.
The simplest way to characterize the objectives of the two
parties is to assume the following cost functions for party D (Z^)
and party/i (Z''):
(4) 'Z = / q^z, =/(?'- (II, — c) — b'y,
t-0 (-0 L
c> 0; 6' > 0; 0 < q < 1;
(5) z'= t.^'^•;'t
In (4) and (5) q is the discount factor, identical for the two parties.
In (4) output growth enters linearly and not quadratically. This
greatly simplifies the algebra, leaving the results qualitatively
unchanged. The positive parameter c represents the optimal infla-
tion rate for party D, regardless of whether or not this inflation is
expected. For simplicity and without loss of generality, it is
assumed that party R does not attribute any value to unexpected
inflation, and that the optimal level of inflation for this party is
zero. By substituting (3) into (4), assuming tbat y = 0 for simplic-
ity), one gets
\"' — Z . 1 ~l £. . T Q
1
(-0
where
h - b'y;
8. Tbese distortions may be due to taxes (as emphasized, for example, by
Barro-Gordon [1983]), or monopolistic unions that keep the real wage "too high" to
maximize the welfare of union members (as emphasized, for example, by TabelHni
[1985] and DrifHl [1985]). Alesina-Tabellini [forthcoming] discuss the connection
between these two distortions.656 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OFECONOMICS
The cost functions (5) and (6) ean also be interpreted as the
reduced forms of a different model. Suppose that the economy is
characterized not by a Lucas supply function such as (3) but by an
exploitable tradeoff between inflation and unemployment so that
"expected policy matters." A model with a standard Phillips curve
can be reduced to a form identical to (5) and (6) even abstracting
from considerations about the inflation tax. The reason is that in
sucb a model tbe optimal inflation rate for the two parties would be
differerit if they pick different points on the exploitable tradeoff.
Consider a simple Phillips curve sucb as
(7) y, = n,-x^^
where 0 < X < 1. Then, even if c - 0 in (4), substituting (7) into (4), it
follows that ./,. I
(8) z^ = x; q'[i 11= - Mn, - nn -b{i-\)
Equation (8) essentially is equivalent to (6) for the purpose of this
paper. The crucial characteristics of the game are in fact the same
using either specification: the optimal inflation rates for the two
parties are different, and tbe time-consistent rate of inflation is
higher than the optimal rate for party D. The analysis of this paper
could also be applied to models with overlapping labor contracts
lasting more than one period [Fischer, 1977; Taylor, 1980] or with
sticky prices. These models, however, would be more difficult to
analyze in this game-theoretic framework because one would have
to consider in period ( expectations formed in periods (t - 1),
it - 2), etc.
The model will be solved with (5) and (6), using the first
interpretation based on the Lucas supply function (3). It is impor-
tant to stress that this specification of the model implies complete
policy neutrality in a standard one-party system.
It is assumed that the policymaker can control inflation
directly. For the purpose of this paper, nothing would be gained by
assuming that the party in office can control money creation if the
model is then closed by a quantity equation. No distinction is made
between the central bank and the government: tbe assumption is
tbat the party in office has control over monetary policy.®
9. The Federal Reserve is certainly not completely independent from the
Administration. Havrilesky [1986] has recently stressed this point and surveyed
some of the literature on the subject. Weintraub 11978] also raises serious doubts
about the independence of the Fed.^ MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 657
Elections take place at discrete intervals of N periods, with A^^
given exogenously. Elections are held at the beginning of the period.
The elected party chooses its policy—the inflation rate—immedi-
ately after the election for the same period. The probability distri-
bution of electoral outcomes is taken as exogenous and "common
knowledge": party D is elected with probability P; and party R with
probability (1 - P). This assumption is adopted for simplicity in
order to abstract from issues related to voting. Alesina [1986] shows
how this assumption can be relaxed without altering any of the
qualitative features of the results presented in this paper as long as
voters are rational, forward-looking, and informed about the objec-
tives of the two parties. The crucial assumption is that there is
uncertainty about the distribution of voters' preferences. Thus, for
given expected policies, the result of the elections is uncertain.
III. DISCRETIONARY EQUILIBRIUM
In a discretionary regime the policymaker minimizes his costs,
taking as given the current and future actions of the public and his
own future moves. This corresponds to the "one-shot" Nash equi-
librium for this game. The timing is as follows. If t is an election
year, polls are taken in period (t - 1). They reveal that party D will
win with prohability P and party R with probability {1 - P). Once
the polls are taken, wage contracts are signed for period t. At the
beginning of period t, elections are held, and immediately after
elections the elected party chooses n,.
It is easy to show the following (the superscripts D and R
indicate the party):
PROPOSITION 1. The one-shot Nash equilibrium (discretion) is
given by
flf = b + c Vt;
nf = 0 vt;
^t+kN = ^UkN = Pib + c) if i is an electoral year; k: 0,1,...;
Wtu^kN = ^Ui+kN = b + c i=l,...,N - I
if D is elected at time t + kN;
WtU+kN = ^UukN = 0 I = 1, . . . , N - 1
if R is elected at time t + kN.
Proof. If party D is elected at time t, in every period it solves
(9) min [^ n? - fc (n, - nn - c nj.658 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OFECONOMICS
taking Ilf as given. Solving (9) yields
(10) nf = b + c.
The analogous problem is solved by Party R; the result is ri'' = 0. If £
is an electoral year, tbe wage-setters set
(11) «;, = nr = PE (nf) + (1 - P)E inf) = Pib + c).
In a non-electoral year, wage-setters have perfect foresight, as tbere
are no electoral surprises.
Several empirical implications can be derived from tbis Propo-
sition.
Q.E.D.
(i) In the first period of a D administration, there is "unex-
pected inflation" and output growth above tbe natural
level (i.e., zero). In fact, from Proposition 1, using (3), one
obtains
(12) yf = yil - P)(b + c), ifD is elected at time i.
If party R is elected, there is a recession. In fact, using (3),
it follows that
(13) yf = - yP(b + c), if R is elected at time t.
In the remaining (N ~ I) period(s) of both administra-
tions, there cannot be any policy surprises, so output
growth is at its natural level.
(ii) The amplitude of these deviations of output growth from
zero is positively correlated with tbe distance between the
points of view of the two parties. In fact, the more
different are the optimal rates of inflation for the two
parties (c and zero) and the more different their incen-
tives to generate policy surprises (6 and zero), the bigger
are the deviations of output growth from zero (ceteris
paribus). Tbus, the model implies tbat the more polarized
is the political system, the wider are tbe economic fluctua-
tions.
(iii) The lower (higher) is P, the higher (lower) is the output
growth determined by party D if elected and tbe smaller
(bigger) is the recession determined by party R. In fact,
the less expected is the policy implemented by the elected
party, the stronger are the real effects of that policy.
(iv) Inflation is always higher during a D administration tbanMACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 659
during an R administration for two reasons: the optimal
inflation rate is higher for party D and this party bas a
stronger incentive to generate surprises; thus, tbe time-
consistent rate of inflation is higher tban tbe optimal rate
for this party.^**
It is worth emphasizing tbat none of the implications above
would change qualitatively had we assumed that c = 0; i.e., if we had
assumed that the parties have the same optimal policy. For all of
the results above to bold, it is necessary and sufficient that the
time-consistent policies of the two parties are different. A differ-
ence in tbe time-consistent policies may or may not imply a
difference in tbe optimal policies.
The costs of the discretionary regime as perceived by party D
before the elections of time t are, in eacb period,
(14) zf = lP{b'-c').
For party R, tbe same costs are
(15) zf = iPib + cf.
The costs for party R are increasing with P, the probability that this
party loses the election. Tbe costs for party D are decreasing with P
if and only if 6 < c. If 6 is "too bigh," the inflationary bias
introduced by party D due to its incentive to generate unexpected
inflation is so strong that party D itself would prefer to reduce its
likelihood of being elected, in order to reduce tbis inefficiency.
IV. THE EFFICIENT FRONTIER
For expositional purposes, let us consider first the case in
which iV = 1; i.e., tbere are elections every period. In this case every
period is exactly alike. The more general case will be discussed in
Section VII. The efficient frontier of the game can be found by
solving, in each period.
[|nr6(nfnr)cnf]
(16) + (1 - P) t^ nf - 6 (nf - nn - c nf]
10. The rate of inflation generated by party D is constant for the entire term in
office. This is due to the fact that output enters linearly in the objective function of
this party. Had we assumed a quadratic objective function in output, the inflation in
the first period of a Z) administration would be lower tban tbe inflation in tbe
remaining {N - 1) period(s). More details on thia case can be found in Alesina
[1985].660 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OFECONOMICS
In (16) 6 is the relative weight attributed to party fl's cost.
Furthermore, we are interested in the portion of the efficient
frontier in which both parties are better off than in the one-shot
Nash equilibrium. Thus, we want to^ impose the following con-
straints of individual rationality:
(17) • ' •, ' 2?-2?.
(18) zf^^f.
The solution of this problem yields the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2. The efficient frontier of the game is given by
nf = nf ^ nr = -^ vt,
where 9 > 0 and 0(P) ^ 6 ^ e{P).
The two bounds of individual rationality {9 and $) can be found by
imposing (17) and (18).
The "folk theorem" of repeated games assures that, for q
sufficiently close to 1, any individually rational point on the
efficient frontier can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Therefore, sufficiently farsighted parties can completely avoid
macroeconomic fluctuations by choosing a policy intermediate
between the two individually most preferred policies. This result is
due to the convexity of the cost functions of the two parties: an
identical policy rule followed by both parties and thus obtained
with certainty, irrespective of the party in office, makes both parties
better off than the expected value of the two noncooperative
policies weighted by the probability distribution of electoral
outcomes.
By substituting the result of Proposition 2 into the cost
functions ofthe two parties, one obtains the efficient frontier in cost
space as
(19) z'^^z'' -CyJ2^.
This curve is represented in Figure I, where N is the one-shot Nash
point and the segment between A and B of the curve is the set of
individually rational points on the efficient frontier. Different
choices of B can be identified with different points on the efficient
frontier of Figure I. For example, the higher is /?, the closer is the
policy chosen to tbe optimal policy of party R and vice versa.
The choice of 6 can be interpreted as a bargaining problem
between the two parties. It would be desirable for the resolution ofMACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 661
t
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FIGURE I
this problem to be related to the relative popularity of the two
parties. In other words, the lower is P, the higher should be d, the
relative weight attributed to party R. The Nash bargaining solution
has precisely this implication. This solution is based on the assump-
tion that the two parties know that if an agreement is not reached,
each party would follow its individually most-preferred policy.
These policies characterize the "disagreement point." The follow-
ing proposition, proved in the Appendix, characterizes this
solution.
PROPOsmoN 3. If 6* is the Nash bargaining solution of the game,
then the following holds: '
(i)
(ii)
is a function only of P: 6* (P);
de*
~dP'^ '662 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OFECONOMICS
(iii) e* il) = 1;
(iv) lim 6* (P) = o=; lim 6* (P) = 0.
' p^o p—1
Tbus, even in the case of full cooperation in which both parties
adopt tbe same policy, the chosen policy is dependent upon the
popularity level of the two parties. If, for example, P exogenously
increases, party D knows that its costs are lower if an agreement is
not reached because this party is more likely to be elected at the
disagreement point." This increases the bargaining power of party
D. As a result, the optimal policy chosen is closer to that party's
point of view; i.e., 0 is reduced. Therefore, each party benefits from
an increase in its own popularity. In fact, it is easy to check that
dz^' az^' dd* „
and
where Z"' and Z'*' are the costs for the two parties evaluated at the
Nash bargaining solution on the efficient frontier. If P tends to
either of the extreme values of zero or one, 0* also tends to its
extreme values of zero or infinity, while if the parties are equally
likely to be elected, their points of view are weighted equally.
The basic qualitative features ofthe Nash bargaining solution,
namely that tbe selected point of the efficient frontier is more
favorable to the party that is more likely to be elected, would apply
also to alternative ways of choosing a point on the efficient frontier.
These features derive from the fact that a change in P affects the
costs of the two parties at the "disagreement point." Any solution
concept used to select a point on the efficient frontier would be
sensitive to such a change: in particular, an increase in the welfare
of a player at the disagreement point would, ceteris paribus, imply
that the selected point on tbe efficient frontier would be more
favorable to that player.^^ In summary, the common sense captured
by these results is that the more popular party can impose upon the
other an agreement close to its point of view.
11. Alesina [1986] shows that in a model in which tbe probability of electoral
outcome is endogenous, "popularity" of a party bas to be interpreted in this context
as the likelihood of electing this party, if the noncooperative policies are followed.
12. This would be the ease if, for example, the solution proposed by Kalai-
Smorodinsky [1975] or an asymmetric Naah-bargaining solution were chosen.MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 663
V. SUSTAINABILITY OF THE EFFICIENT FRONTIER
Not all points on the efficient frontier are sustainable as a
subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e., as a time-consistent policy, for
any value of P and q unless binding commitments are available.
Once elected, each party bas an incentive to break the cooperation
with the other party and play a policy advantageous to its own
constituency in the short run. Suppose that before an election the
parties announce that they would follow the optimal cooperative
policy; i.e., n° = n** = c/[l + d*{P)]. If this announcement is
believed by the public, then n^ = n^ = n**. After the election, the
victorious party has an incentive to deviate from the announced
policy and minimize its short-run costs by playing its one-shot Nash
strategy. In particular, party D's incentive arises from two sources:
the desire to determine unexpected inflation, therefore "cheating"
on the wage-setters' expectations, and the desire to break the
implicit agreement with the competing party to cooperate on a
"middle policy." Party R faces only the second incentive, since it
does not attribute any value to unexpected inflation. Without any
form of enforcement, the only possible equilibrium would be the
suboptimal one-shot Nash described in Proposition 1. Thus, bind-
ing commitment of both parties to the optimal policy would force
them to stick to a rule that makes them both better off, even if in
the short run both parties would want to follow a different policy
more favorable to their own constituencies.
However, even if absolutely binding commitments are unavail-
able, reputational considerations are taken into account if the
players understand that their interaction is repeated over time and
thus that today's action influences the actions tomorrow of the
other players. The solution concept adopted for the repeated game
is that proposed by Friedman 11971]: the crucial assumption in this
solution concept is that if one player deviates from cooperation, the
other players will no longer believe that player's announcements
and will play noncooperatively; i.e., they play the "one-shot" Nash
strategy.^^ Thus, there is a reversion to the noncooperative outcome
if a player cheats. Note that the costs of a deviation from coopera-
tion of, say, party D, arise from two sources: the reversion of party R
to the noncooperative policy and tbe reversion of the expectations
of the public to the noncooperative equilibrium.
13. Abreu [1983] has shown that harsher punishments than the reversion to the
one-shot Nash can be credibly threatened. Rogoff [1987] has applied these more
complex strategies to a monetary policy game. Here we restrict our attention to the
reversion to the one-shot Nash.664 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OFECONOMICS
Thelengthof the reversion to the noncooperative outcome, i.e.,
the "punishment period," is somewhat arbitrary in this type of
game. Since the threat of a reversion to Nash is always credible, the
"best" equilibrium can be sustained if the length of the punishment
period is infinite. This assumption is made here, with no loss of
generality. It can be shown easily tbat the length of the punishment
and the value ofthe discount factor are completely isomorphic. The
following result can then be established.
PROPOSITION 4. For any given B, the conditions that have to be
satisfied to make the rules n" = n" = c/(l + 5) sustainable as a
subgame perfect equilibrium are
(22)
r "' 1 -\-B
+ (b + c)Hl - q - Pq) + 2 Pqdb + c) - 0;
12
(23)
Proof. Equation (22) is the condition of subgame perfection
for party D. It can be obtained as follows. If party D is elected, it
faces the temptation (T^) of playing n^ = (6 + c) instead of the
cooperative policy II = c/(l -i- 6). Thus,
-I- 6 6 -I- c - + c{b + c).
\ 1 + ^
If party D plays (6 -I- c), it knows that in the future the one-shot
Nash equilibrium will prevail instead of the rule c/(l + 6). The
enforcement {E^) is given by the difference between the cost ofthe
Nash equilibrium and the cost ofthe cooperative rule. Therefore,
(25) E
1 - o 2^ ' ^ ' 2\l-\-6 1 + B
Equation (22) follows from a simple manipulation of (24) and (25).
Analogous argument applied to party R leads to (23). Note that to
obtain these conditions we have considered tbe private agents
acting rationally. They know that if a cheating episode occurred, the
outcome of the game would revert to a one-shot Nash forever;MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 665
tberefore, tbey would expect this outcome forever in the future if
tbey observed a cheating episode.
Q.E.D.
Inspection of (22) and (23) confirms that the less the two parties
discount the future, the easier it is to sustain the cooperative rule.
Furthermore, it is easy to verify that the lower is 6, the more
difficult it is to satisfy the sustainability condition for party R, and
vice versa. The party whose interests are weighted less would find it
less attractive to cooperate because the cooperative rule chosen is
farther away from its point of view. Given Proposition 3, one might
suspect that it should be easier to sustain full cooperation when P is
relatively close to %. In fact, if P is close to any of its extremes, so is
t, and one of the two parties would lose interest in playing coopera-
tively. Thus, in an unbalanced system in which one party has little
chance of ever being elected, cooperation would be harder to sustain
because that party has a strong incentive to deviate from coopera-
tion and play its own preferred policy when elected.
In order to quantify these considerations, one would need a
closed form for the Nash bargaining solution {$*). Lacking this, an
approximation can be considered as an example:
(26) r =. (1 - P)/P.
It is easy to verify that this expression satisfies all the characteris-
tics described in Proposition 3 for the Nash bargaining solution.
This approximation is particularly precise for P close to ^L Further-
more, it can be verified that the qualitative features of the results
that follow do not change if different approximations are used.
Substituting (26) into (22) and (23) yields the following constraints
of subgame perfection:
(27) ^-(6T^ (party/?);
These conditions have an intuitive interpretation. Suppose for a
moment that 6 = 0. In this case, the game would be symmetric
because party D would not face the additional incentive to cheat on
private agents' expectations that party R does not have. Conditions
(27) and (28) would reduce to
(29) 9 > P;666
(30)
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In Figure II the area ABC is the one in which both (29) and (30) are
satisfied, and full cooperation is attainable. It is easiest to sustain
full cooperation when P = ^2', i.e., when two parties are of equal
popularity. With b =^ 0, the system loses its symmetry because of
the additional incentive to deviate from announcements that only
party D has. Figure III shows that because of this additional
temptation the area in which full cooperatiori_is sustainable shrinks,
and it is easiest to sustain cooperation at P > '^. Therefore, in a
system in which there is a very weak and a very strong party, there is
less incentive for the two parties to cooperate than in a more
balanced system. This effect is particularly strong if the weaker
party is also the party that benefits more from policy surprises.
VI. THE BEST CREDIBLE POLICIES '' '
Full cooperation may not be sustainable if the parties discount
tbe future heavily. There are several reasons why q may be low.
Besides the usual ones, an additional reason stems from the solution
concept used for this game and the length of the punishment period
chosen. For example, one party may assign a positive probability to
the event that the leadership of the opponent party may change in
tbe future and that the new leadership will not carry out the threats
O 1/2 D
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ofthe old. This could be modeled by assigning a positive probability
to a finite length of the period in which the system reverts to the
one-shot Nash if a cheating episode occurs; in this game this is
qualitatively equivalent to assuming a low discount factor.
Let us continue to assume that the parties use the Nash
solution to solve the bargaining problem (i.e., to choose 6). The best
credible rules can be found by solving problem (16) under the two
subgame perfection constraints. These two constraints assure that
tbe policies followed by the two parties are credible, i.e., time-
consistent. They can be obtained by imposing that any pair of
policies (n^.n'') has to satisfy the condition that the temptation to
deviate from them is not greater tban the enforcement associated
with this deviation. Tbese constraints can be written following the
same steps used in the proof of Proposition 4. The following result
characterizes this solution.
PROPOSITION 5. If the Nasb bargaining solution on the efficient
frontier, n^ = n^ = n^ = c/[l + e*{P)], cannot be credibly
announced b^ the two parties, then if q > 0, the best credible
policies (n°,n'') satisfy the following condition:
6 -F c> n^ {q,P,b,c) > c/(l -\- 6 *{P)) > n" iq,P,b,c) 0.
If and only if q = 0, the best credible policies are
n" = 6 + c; n'' ^ 0.668 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OFECONOMICS
The proof is in the Appendix. In the Appendix it is also shown
that under very general conditions the following holds:
(31) —— > 0, —— < 0 for any value of q.
oq aq
Furthermore, there exists a q such that, for q < q, (31) always
holds.
Proposition 5 highlights that if q is low, tbe parties do not care
about tbe future very much, and they follow policies that tend to
minimize their short-run costs. Their announcements become less
credible both to the opponent party and the private agents. As a
result, the parties' policies tend to diverge toward tbeir respective
one-shot Nash policies.
Thus, if full cooperation is not sustainable, the economy
exhibits output and inflation fluctuations. In fact, if party D is
elected at time t, it follows that
(32) y,^yil
and if party R is elected,
Since n" > II", there is a recession with low inflation with an R
administration, and an expansion above the natural rate with a D
administration. Furthermore, the variances of output and of infla-
tion are decreasing functions of the discount factor and increasing
functions of 6 and c, i.e., the distance between the two parties'
points of view.
In this type of game there is no assurance that the players
would indeed pick the "best" of the infinitely many subgame
perfect Nash equilibria of the game. The multiplicity of equilibria
in this type of game is a well-documented disturbing fact: Rogoff
[1987] investigates tbis issue in the context of monetary policy
games. However, the proof of Proposition 5 highlights that if the
policies n'^ = n'' = c/(l -t- 6) are not sustainable, all the subgame
perfect equilibria satisfy the condition tbat 11^ > 11^. Thus, the
positive implications of the paper for the business cycle do not
require that the parties pick the best credible policies but only that
tbey pick any credible policy wben the flrst best is not sustainable.
VII. EXTENSIONS
The extension to the case of multiperiod administrations is
conceptually quite simple. The one-shot Nash equilibrium for thisMACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 669
case bas been already characterized in Proposition 1. It is easy to
verify that the efficient frontier is the same for a multiperiod
administration; i.e., 11^ = n^ = c/(l + 6) in each period. However,
the conditions of sustainability of tbe efficient frontier as a perfect
equilibrium are not the same in different periods of an administra-
tion. Consider, for example, party /?. Even though its temptation to
cheat is the same in every period, the enforcement is a function of
the distance in time from the following elections. During tbe ^th
year of a ft administration, the enforcement (Ef) is, in fact,
(34) Ef = [q^^''~Ml - qmz'' - z^-
Clearly, the farther away in time is the next election, the
farther in the future is the beginning of the "punishment" if a
deviation from announcements occurs; therefore, the lower is the
enforcement. The same considerations would apply to party D. The
only difference for party D is that part of the "punishment" would
occur immediately after a cheating episode due to the reversion of
expectations of the private agents to the Nash outcome. However,
the "punishment" coming from party R's reversion to the one-shot
Nash would not occur until tbe following election. Both parties have
then a stronger incentive to deviate from announcements of coop-
erative agreements at the beginning of the terms of office; thus
following Proposition 5, it can be argued that the farther in the
future are the following elections the more different are the policies
of the two parties. Note, however, that policy surprises creating
deviations of output growth from its natural level can occur only in
the first period of an administration.
Thus far we have emphasized the strategic interaction of the
two parties. This paper can incorporate as a particular case the
reputational mechanism involving only the public's expectations, as
in Barro-Gordon [1983]. Consider, for example, the case in which
party R always sets n'* = 0 because, for example, it completely
discounts the future and cares only about the inflation rate when in
office. In this situation party D would not necessarily follow the
policy n^ = 6 -f- c, i.e., the one-shot Nash policy. By engaging in a
reputational game with the public, party D can sustain a policy fl'*
that satisfies tbe following:
c. (35) • . c < n^ < 6 +
Needless to say, party D would never find it in its interest to follow a
policy n^ < c, since c is the optimal inflation rate for this party and
party R is not willing to cooperate to an intermediate policy. A
policy such as n° in (35) could be enforced by means of trigger670 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OFECONOMICS
Strategies involving the public's expectations. If party D announces
fl'* and then deviates, following 11° = 6 -i- c, the public would expect
this party to follow b + c in the future. Thus, some algebra
establishes that the enforcement associated with a deviation from
the rule U^ in the Jth period of an N period's administration is
(36) £"-" _ —
p^N.X-J
1-9
The first term in (36) represents the eosts of the reversion of
expectation to fe + c during the remaining (N - J) period(s) of the
current administration. The second term represents the effect of
the reversion of expectations after the end of the current term of
office. Using (36), it is easy to verify that the best credible policy for
party D satisfies (35). If q is sufficiently close to 1, the policy U^ = c
is credible."''
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper characterizes an economic cycle connected to the
political cycle. The predictions of the model are quite different from
those of the political business cycle literature which implies that
one should observe recessions at the beginning of any type of
administration and inflationary expansions toward the end. The
prediction of this paper is that in the United States one sbould
instead observe recessions at the beginning of Republican adminis-
trations, as compared with output growth above trend and higher
inflation at the beginning of Democratic administrations. In the
second part of both types of administrations, output growth should
be about the same, with higher inflation during a Democratic
administration. Alesina-Sachs [forthcomingl find that these
empirical implications are not rejected by United States post-
World War II data.
14. It is easy to verify that for P = 1, i.e., the case of a single party, (36) is
equivalent to the Enforcement of Barro-Gordon [1983]; the only difference is that
Barro and Gordon consider a punishment of one period, while here the punishment
period is infinite. The interaction of the punishment coming from the public and
from the opponent party is also explored in a different context by Rogoff-Sibert
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The results presented in this paper do not rely on irrational
expectations formation or irrational voting behavior. Although
voting is exogenous in tbis paper, Alesina [19861 shows that all the
results of the present paper can be generalized in a model with
rational and perfectly informed voters. Tbe assumption adopted
about voting has emphasized the contrast between this paper and
the traditional "political business cycle" literature; Rogofif-Sibert
[1985] bave shown that a cycle on inflation similar to that of
Nordbaus [1975] can be generated in a model witb rational but
imperfectly informed voters. It should be stressed tbat tbe present
paper and that of Rogoff and Sibert are in many respects comple-
mentary, and in principle future research could develop both
insights into a unified framework.
The equilibrium with cycles in this model has been shown to be
suboptimal. If the parties agree to follow an identical policy, the
cycle is avoided. There would be no fluctuations in output, and
inflation and both constituencies would be better off. This policy
has been characterized formally as the result of a bargaining process
between the two parties, in which the more popular party can
impose an agreement closer to its point of view. A commitment to
the cooperative rule is beneficial because it binds the two parties to
a policy that improves welfare for both of them in tbe long run.
Even if binding commitments are not available, reputational forces
due to the repeated interaction ofthe two parties and the public can
improve upon the discretionary equilibrium by reducing the magni-
tude of the fluctuations of inflation and output.
The central ideas of tbis paper are quite general and go well
beyond the specific example on inflation and output. This paper
has shown how the repeated interaction of political parties may
reduce the excess volatility of policies. Tbe reduction of volatility is
particularly beneficial in all the cases in which frequent and drastic
switches of policies associated with changes in administrations are
costly.^^ In all these cases reputational mechanisms such as those
described in tbis paper create an incentive for the two parties to
converge to more similar policies and create less disruption when a
change in administration occurs.
15. A referee has suggested the following example. Suppose that the govern-
ment has complete freedom of firing civil service employees. Every time the
incumbent loses the election, the winner may want to fire everybody and appoint
different people. This may create a suboptimally bigb level of turnover. Tbe
repeated interaction of tbe two parties may lead to an equilibrium in whicb higbly
competent party D-affiliated employees are kept in offtce wben party R wins and
vice versa672 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OFECONOMICS
APPENDIX
1. Proof of Proposition 3
The Nash bargaining solution on the efficient frontier is found
by solving the following problem (time subscripts are dropped for
convenience):
(A.I) min (2^ — A'^Xz" - A")
such that
(A.2) z'^ ^z"^ - c^2?,
(A.3) z'^-A^^ 0,
(A.4) 2^^ - A" s 0.
where iA^,A^) is the disagreement point, i.e., the costs for the two
parties if the agreement is not reached. If an agreement is not
reached, the two parties would follow their individual most-
preferred policies. Therefore, party D would choose 11^ •= c, and
party ftn" = 0. It follows that
(A.5) A^--^Pc^;
(A.6) A" = i Pc\
Alternatively, one might choose as the disagreement point the
"one-shot" Nash (i.e., Il'^ = b + c, n^ = 0). The results would not
qualitatively change. Furthermore, it is more reasonable to assume
that party D would follow its most preferred policy if an agreement
is not reached, rather than a suboptimal policy. (The policy 11^ = c
is sustainable for party D, if II" - 0, as shown in Section VII if q is
sufficiently close to one.) Let us redefine for convenience
(A.7) y^-(zD-A'')=- [z" + \Pc^];
The problem then can be rewritten as follows:
(A.9) max 4' = xy,
such that
CA Ifll \i — r P/>2 1 ^ /P/.2 oZ
^rt.iU^ y = X — rC + C-^T^C — ^X,
(A.11) y-0,
(A. 12) X > 0.MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 673
Equation (A. 10) has been rewritten as an equality because the
solution must lie on the frontier. Substituting (A.IO) into (A.9), the
first-order condition of the problem implies that an interior solu-
tion satisfies the following;
(A.13) — ^ 2x -Pc' + CyjPc' - 2x - , ,_ = 0.
On the frontier the costs for party D in each period are
1 c^ c^
~2(l + df~l + 6'
Using (A.5), (A.13). and (A.14), we obtain
(A.15) {Pc^ - 2x) = c/(l + ff)^
Substituting into (A.IO) and rearranging yields
From (A.16) it is easy to verify that B*{P) is a decreasing function of
P for ff > 0. Suppose that P = 0. (A.8) and (A.12) imply that
(A.17) can be satisfied only for 6 — a=. Suppose that P = 1. (A.7) and
(A.ll) imply that
(A. 18) is satisfied if and only if ff = 0. Finally, it is easy to check that
if P = 'k then ff* = 1, using (A.16). • .
Q.E.D.
2. Proof of Proposition 5
After some algebra, it can be shown that the problem to be
solved is the following:
(A.19) min
sucb that
(A.20)
p\n^
n"" +
1
p
1 -
c
-1-
9
Q
ff
2
-1-
n
D"
(1
1
-P)
PQ
— Pq
1 t fl 1
(6 + c) < 0;
p2
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-q-qP) + 2Pqc] - q{l - P) c'^ + {b + c)[ib +
The conditions of individual rationality have also to be satisfied at
the solution. The constraint of subgame perfection for party R
(A.20) is an ellipse centered on the origin (see Figure IV). The
intersections with the axes are
(A.22) (6
n'
o
FIGURE IV
D: {b + c)(l - q) + qPc
\ - q + Pq
A:
E:
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(A.23) n«= ± ^ jb + c).
l-Pq
The constraint for party D (A.22) is an ellipse centered at
(A.24)
Note that
(fe + c)( - g) -H qPc
1 -q + qP
^A9M (6 -F c)(l - g) + gPc .
(A.25) c < ; -; <b + c.
1 - q + qP
Suppose that tbe Nasb bargaining solution on the efficient frontier
lies outside both feasible sets (point -4 in Figure IV). Tbe solution of
tbe problem is in the dashed area. By construction this proves that,
at the solution,
(A.26) n°>c/(l + e*)>n^
From (A.19) it follows that a pair of policies (n'',Il^) with n'' < 0 is
clearly inferior to the pair (0,n°) for ^ > 0. By construction, if the
former pair is sustainable, so is the latter. By construction, a pair of
policies (fl'',n'^) witb n^ > 6 -f c is not sustainable for party R.
Therefore, the first part of the proposition follows. Suppose that
q = 0. Then the two constraints of subgame perfection, (A.21) and
(A.22), become
(A.27) n"' < 0,
(A.28) [n^ -{b + c)r ^ 0.
From (A.27) and (A.28) it follows that if q = 0, the only subgame
perfect equilibrium is the one-shot Nash. It is easy to verify that, as
long as q > 0, a dashed area such as that of Figure la exists, and
some cooperation is sustainable, i.e., n'^ < 6 + c and n" > 0 at the
solution.
Let us now consider a fall in q. The two feasible sets shrink. In
fact, any combination of strategies sustainable at a lower q has to be
sustainable at a higher q. It is easy to verify algebraically that tbis is
in fact the case. Graphically the shift is described in Figure V, where
the two feasible sets at tbe lower value of q are represented with
dashed lines. From (A.24) it follows tbat the center of party D's
ellipses moves to the right along tbe horizontal line n'' = c, when qn
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falls. Note tbat if a change in q does not change the value of 6* at the
solution, the following holds (at the solution):
(A.29)
dq dq
Conditions (A.29) bold in general if the change in 0 at the solution
associated witb a change in q is not too big. Furthermore, as long as
the chosen 6 is such that c/(l -i- ff) lies between /Cj and K^ in Figure
V, (A.29) holds. In fact, in this case tbe solution shifts from H to //',
thus satisfying (A.29). Thus, by construction, it follows immediately
that there exists a value of q, say q, such tbat, for q ^ q, (A.29)
always hold.
Q.E.D.
CARNEGIE MELLON
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